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ABSTRACT 
A historical survey highlighting currents in 
Latvian history which have served as the foundation for 
the existence of modern Latvian nationalism. According 
to the survey Latvian nationalism is determined to be 
the result of many factors the most primary being: 
a) An ancient ethnically distinct people whose culture 
and language was laid moribund, but survived in spite 
of the 13th century entrenchment of the German 
Crusaders and subsequent overlordship of their 
descendants the so-called "Baltic Barony". 
b) A 19th century "National Awakening" which freed 
nationalist Latvian impulses and culminated with 
national independence in 1920. 
c) The national viability and achievement of a brief 
two decades as an independent nation state cut short by 
Soviet annexation in 1939. 
d) Timely advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's enlightened 
policies. 
Research utilizes some primary sources, as well 
as books, journal articles, pamphlets and newspapers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are together known 
as the Baltic States. They share in common the 
historical environment from which their respective 
cultures, stretching back millennia, emerged. The 
, 
present day Baltic States, independent nation-states 
from 1918 until their forcible annexation by the Soviet 
Union in 1940, are currently among several Soviet 
Republics searching for effective means to regain their 
sovereignty and independence. 
In Latvia, encouraged by Gorbachev's enlightened 
policies, nearly 230,000 out of a population of about 
2.6 million 1 have joined a nationalist group, the 
"Tautas Frontes", i.e. the Latvian Popular Front or The 
Latvian Peoples Front (LTF). On May 4, 1990 an LTF 
majority in the Latvian Parliament voted to declare the 
re-establishment of national independence. Without a 
doubt the emergence of this new political landscape is 
a manifestation of the spirit of nationalism so 
resolute in the Latvian people. For nationalism, among 
other things, is an expression of interest in the 
preservation or defense of ethnic identity. 
Ethnic identity is defined by any number of 
cultural aspects which people choose to identify with 
1 BATUN, Chronology of Events in Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, (New York) 1988. · 
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collectively. In the case of Latvia, nationalism. 
• 
evolved out of the Latvian's collective historical 
experiences defining their confrontations with dynamic 
and aggressive neighbors and invaders. The rise of the 
LTF itself, as the foundation of current Latvian 
nationalism, rests to a large degree upon such historic 
foundations. 
Latvian nationalism, specifically, .is on the o~e 
hand a conscious affirmation of the ancient heritage 
which an ethnically distinct people managed to 
preserve, especially following the thirteenth century 
when overshadowed and repressed by an entrenched German 
elite and its cultural values, and on the other, a 
strident and aggressive self assertion, against great 
odds, with little, if any, assistance or encouragement 
from other countries. 
~ 
For a second time in this twentieth century, the 
Latvian people find themselves confronted with the need 
to work toward national independence from their Russian 
suzerain. An examination into the development of 
~ 
Latvian nationalism, and why it survived to this 
present day with such indomitable force, therefore~ 
seems especially appropriate. The questions to be 
answered are how and why nationalism plays so major a 
role in current Latvian relations with the Soviet 
Union. 
3 
CHAPTER I 
THE ANCIENT LATVIAN HISTORIC LEGACY 
Latvia occupies the central position in the East-
Baltic region, which stretches from the Gulf of Finland 
southward along the east coast of the Baltic Sea. It 
is sandwiched between Estonia to the north and 
Lithuania to the south. The peoples of the Baltic 
region~ trace their descent from a tribal myriad 
populating these northern environs in the Neolithic Age 
(2000 BC). The current Baltic national groups belong 
to the earliest established European groups with ethnic 
identities, each having its own culture and language. 
The Latvian language is included among the Inda-
European family of languages but has been determined to 
be older than Sanskrit. The evidence suggests that 
ancient Latvia already enjoyed much wealth, especially 
during the Bronze (15 hundred - 5th century BC) and 
subsequent Iron Ages (8th - 12th centuries). It traded 
in amber, very highly prized by the Mediterranean 
civilizations for its real or imagined ''magical" 
powers. ~uch of the ambe~ was mined along the shores 
of East Prussia,. Kurland (the· we~t Latvian coast), and 
the Gulf of Riga and then exported across the Baltic 
4 
Sea or via river routes leading south. The commercial 
ties which the amber trade fostered with Rome, 
Byzantium, and Persia established the Baltic region as 
a great economic entity in its own right. Its wealth 
significantly aided in the strengthening and 
prolongation of tribal identity and culture as well as 
technical sophistication. 
By the end of the Iron Age the Latvians, 
recognized as ethnically distinct, were ranked among 
the Inda-European medieval peoples as generally skilled 
artisans and far~ers living in lands rich ~nd 
productive in a variety of foodstuffs. 
Latvian yeoman farmers were not serfs. They 
lived with their families on independently owned land. 
Related families would join together as a larger family 
and form a clan with its own administrative unit 
governed by the oldest of the clan as chieftain, . i.e. 
forerunner of the later kings. During the Midctle Ages 
the five Latvian tribal kingdoms of Latgale, Talavia, 
Kur, Selonia, and Zemgallia developed in this manner, 
according to some historians King Vissevald of Latgale 
would have succeeded in uniting them into one nation by 
the late 1200's had it not been for the vicissitudes of 
Baltic geography. 2 But Latviais geographic location 
2 Bilmanis, A History of Latvia, p. 49. 
5 
made its area. the envy of neighboring peoples. Between 
the fifth and ninth centuries Scandinavian marauders, 
the most successful of whom were the Vikings, roamed 
the Baltic hinterlands. Their encounters with the 
Latvians were not altogether belligerent. Indeed, the j 
Latvians adopted such aspects of Scandinavian 
civilization as its systems of weights, measurements 
and accounting. 3 The Danes, following closely on the 
heels of the Vikings, e~tablished a foothold in the 
Latvian region of Kurzeme in 1048 not yielding until 
Piltene in 1219. Conversely, the sea-faring Latvian 
coastal tribe of Kurs for many years haunted the Danish 
coast. 4 
Between the ninth and twelfth centuries the 
Russians, too, invaded. But their repeated attempts to 
intrude by land were successfully blocked by 
"strongholds", or united garrisons, established under 
the auspices of Latvian tribal leaders. These Russian 
invasion attempts ended when the Russians themselves 
came under attack by the Mongols and, beginning with 
the fall of ·their capital Kiev in 1240, remained 
subjugated to Mongol overlordship for nearly two 
hundred and fifty years. This freed the Baltic areas 
3 Ibid. , p. 3 4. 
4 Ibid., p. 36. 
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for a quarter millennium from Russian aggression but 
not the influence of the German crusaders. For the 
Latvians the latter was to re~ain significant long 
after the end of the crusades. 
Religious fervor may have been the impulse for 
the crusades of the early thirteenth century, but the 
mercurial promise of Baltic riches heightened it. The 
five Latvian tribes fought the crusading German Order 
of the Brothers of the Sword for thirty years but in 
the end succumbed militarily and politically to so 
great a force as sponsored by the Chur~h of Rome. 
Placed under the German Order's suzerainty, the 
Latvians experienced feudalism with all its rights and 
privileges, including land grants, tribute, and labor-
duties. Livonia, or the Livonian Confederation, as the 
Latvian lands were henceforth called, was to be 
repeatedly divided into Church states governed by the 
knights who replaced the Latvian kings and chieftains 
as overlords. Christianity-as preached by the Roman 
Church displaced the pagan beliefs. Over time their 
prevailing religious-cultural bond with the rulers 
shifted toward solely economic concerns. Meanwhile the 
Latvian peasantry, with the exception of its 
obligations as serfs, was simply left alone and receded 
into the background. For nearly five hundred years the 
7 
knights, eventually known as the B~ltic-Germans or 
·Baltic Barony, remained enscoriced as the political and 
economic rul·ing echelon over the Latvian people. 
Initially, that is to say for the almost two 
centuries when the crusading German Order was in direct 
control, the German Hanseatic Trading League also 
effectively furthered development of the Baltic 
region's wealthy trade potentials. Only when the 
strength of the Order began to wane in the wake of the 
tumultuous Reformation of the sixteenth century was 
Latvia once again to be remjnded of the fate which tied 
~ 
it to geography. Poland, Sweden, and Russia moved into 
the power vacuum created by the collapsing German Order 
competeing to expand influe~ce in promotion of their 
own national interests. 
The Russian Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) invaded 
in 1558. The end of the Livonian Order state was 
sealed in 1561. By 1562 Livonia was divided betwe~n 
the Polish-Lithuanian Union and Sweden which, in the 
order listed, intervened to battle Russia in the so-
called Livonian War for nearly two decades and forced 
Russia to relinquish the land it had ~eized. The Duchy 
of Kurzeme, or Courland (1562-1795), encompassing the 
western and southern regions of Latvia, came under the 
I 
suzerainty of the Polish-Lithuanian Union where it 
8 
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remained until the third partition of Poland made it 
part of the Russian Empire. From the late sixteenth 
into the seventeenth century, eastern Latvia (the 
Latgale area) was alternately dominated by Poland and 
Sweden until it also became Russian following the third 
partition of Poland. Morthern Latvia (Livonia) was 
occupied by Russia in the Great Northern War (1700-
1721) and formally ceded to Russia by Sweden in 1721 by 
the Treaty of Nystad. This ended the Northern War and 
confirmed Russian dominance in the Baltic region. 
The influence of the Baltic Barony was reduced 
during the Swedish period of administration because 
Swedish governmental practices and procedures were 
instituted. Sweden left reforms influenced by the fact 
that Sweden was a nation in which free men predominated 
and participated in self-government. While some 
reforms had aimed at upgrading the legal status of the 
Latvian peasants, others governed the peasants' 
relationships with the landowners, the peasantry's 
involvement in local government, and the promotion of 
literacy. 5 Even so, de facto control of regional 
Latvian government reverted to the Baltic Barony which 
5 Edward c. Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, 
1710-1870, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press,1984), p. 6-7. 
9 
resumed its administration of all local parishes and 
institutions as established during the Middle Ages. 
The comprehensive system which had evolved over 
the centuries allowed the Baltic Barony to control, by 
means of an integrated legal-administrative network, 
all aspects of peasant life. This network imposed 
control from above upon the Latvian population through 
the executive branch of a provincial administration, 
the Council of the Diet, downward through the district 
high church wardens, local churches, police forces, and 
courts of the parish and peasant communities.
6 
Sweden's attempt to abolish the Council of the Diet had 
effectively failed because Sweden could not afford to 
alienate the Baltic Barony entirely. Its support was 
needed to provide military forces and agricultural 
foodstuffs. 
The annals of Latvian history usually fondly 
remember the Swedish period
7 because it was then that 
the Latvian people were introduced to formal education, 
which fostering the early inception of ethnic Latvian 
consciousness. The first parish and normal schools, 
the latter designed as teacher's institutions, opened 
6 Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870, 
p. 6. 
7 Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 236. 
10 
their doors to the Latvian peasantry in 1687. 8 For the 
first time pastors of ethnic Latvian origin were 
installed in some parishes. They had completed their 
education at the Swedish-chartered University of 
Dorpat, Estonia. 9 
The Latvian language also appeared for the first 
time in written form during the Swedish period. In 
1685 and 1689, through a subsidy by the Swedish 
government, a Latvian Bible was printed. This printing 
of the Scriptures is regarded as having provided the 
foundation for the entire subsequent development of 
Latvian literature. 10 
The Treaty of Nystad re-affirmed the autonomy 
once enjoyed by the Baltic Barony in Livonia (Livland) 
and Estonia (Estland), according the new Russian 
provinces special treatment. Tsar Peter the Great held 
so high an opinion of the political institutions in 
place there that he wished to replicate them in 
Russia. 11 Wanting to develop Russia according to 
European standards, Tsar Peter needed experts and the 
Baltic Barony soon became his singularly greatest 
8 Bilmanis, A History of Latvia, p. 178. 
9 Bilmanis, p. 179. 
10 Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 238. 
11 · Ibid., p. 9. 
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source within the Russian Empire. Closely tied to 
Germany by virtue of language and heritage and 
possessed with European military, administrative,. 
professional and technical experience, the Baitic 
Barons were regarded so indispensable an asset that the 
Treaty of Nystad12 provided for an article compelling 
each Russian tsar to re-confirm the Baltic region's 
provincial autonomy at the beginning of each reign.
13 
In net effect, this enabled a closed corporation 
consisting of merely three hundred German baronial 
families to maintain a virtual monopoly over all 
landholdings in the area. The Baltic Germans returned 
the favor by becoming not only loyal subjects of the 
Russian tsars but also by assuming the leadership 
opportunities offered them by Peter the Great's 
policies within the Russian military, diplomatic, and 
political arenas. Their influence, in consequence, 
d d 1 
, , 14 
soon reache far beyon the Ba tic regions. 
12 , Ibid., p. 11-12. 
13 J. Rutkis, Latvia: Country and People, 
(Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), 
p. 241. 
14 Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, 
The Baltic States Years of Independence, 
(Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1983), p. 4. 
12 
The areas of Latvia under Russian rule became 
Provinces (Gubernia), i.e. Russian territorial 
administrative units headed by an imperial governor, 
usually a Baltic Baron. Actual administrative rule 
reverted to the Provincial Diet re-installed by Peter 
the Great and headed by the Provincial Councilors 
elected in parish assemblies by the local nobility. 
I 
All governmental bodies were so completely composed of 
Baltic Germans that they were closed not merely to the 
Latvians but even to the Russians. This special-status 
importance of the Baltic Barony to the Russian Empire 
lasted well into the late nineteenth century and 
diminished only in the face of rising Russian 
nationalism and growing anxieties over the implications 
of German unification in 1871. As a parallel 
development, concurrent with the rise in Russian 
nationalism, the Crimean War (1853-1855) began to open 
special doors leading to the emergence of a vital 
native Latvian elite which no longer needed to submit 
unquestioningly to Russian support of the German 
Barony's overlordship. 
Ironically, the loss of Latvian national self-
determination as a consequence of the entrenchment of 
the German crusaders and the period of overlordship 
which their descendants exercised, ensured for the 
13 
Latvian people ethnic survival. As one Baltic scholar 
put it: 
"It would seem that the temporary social 'downward' 
select-ion of the Latvians has saved them from 
dying out, that this social selection has been a 
kind of social refuge ... which has preserved the 
ancient Latvian traditions and vitality, as proved 
by the historical moments when vitality has a 
chance to manifest itself. 1115 
The predominance of German influence did not 
merely spell isolation for the Latvian ethnic 
population, it also exuded a subtle influence immensely 
important for Latvia's future. The introduction in 
Latvia of western Christianity by the crusaders was 
followed by the Reformation and the arrival of the 
Lutheran Church. This introduced both the Protestant, 
' ,,/ 
personalized religious inter-relationship between 
pastors and their congregations, and missionary work as 
pursued by the Moravian Brethren among the Latvian 
population. Both contributed significantly to 
reorienting the formative patterns of thought and 
behavior which helped lay the foundations for the 
Latvian "national awakening" of the nineteenth century 
and the development of the Latvian national self-
. 
consciousness. 
15 Rutkis, Latvia: Country and People, p. 9. 
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CHAPTER·· I I 
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE - THE NATIONAL AWAKENING 
The days of serfdom were numbered throughout the 
Russian E~pire as the nineteenth century dawned. Not 
only was it viewed to be a morally tainted arrangement, 
but it was proving to be an uneconomical system. 
S~rfdom was abolished in the Russian Baltic province of 
Latvia between 1817 and 1819 and eventually in the 
eastern Latvian Latgallian region when it was also 
abolished throughout Russia in 1891. 
The end of serfdom legally freed the Latvian 
people as th~ nineteenth century ushered in its period 
of unprecedented economic development. This 
unalterably affected all areas of Latvian life and 
helps explain the surge of nationalist feelings known 
collectively as the "National Awakening". It, in turn, 
led to the actualization of the Latvian national demand 
for independence and statehood. Its success.ful 
achievement fused a spirit of nationalism within the , 
Latvian psyche. 
It is important to note here that the abolition 
of serfdom, indeed almost all reform efforts, 
originated with the Russian Imperial government. The 
15 
Agrarian Reform Bill of 1804, as the first step toward 
the elimination of serfdom, acknowledged that Latvian 
peasants should not be bartered or sold without the 
land to which they were attached. An accompanying bill 
attempted to help interpret the original. To ensure 
each peasant'~ personal liberty, it defined the rights 
of the peasants and landlords in terms which permitted 
the peasant to own or sell land despite the conditions 
of long lease or hereditary tenure. 16 But the Baltic 
Barony 6pposed this reform and used its influence upon 
the Tsar to favor laws which would completely abolish 
serfdom in exchange for allowing it to regain complete 
control over the land. When serfdom was abolished in 
Latvia slightly more than a decade later, not the 
original intent but the Barony's preference prevailed. 
The peasant was free but no longer effectively 
protected b_y law. Granted the so-called perso·nal 
"Bird's Freedom" (Vogelfrei) he had in reality lost his 
right to ownership of the land he had worked, but not 
the necessity to work it for his keep. In net result, 
he was again enslaved, this time economically. 17 
16 Stanley Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 
p. 13. 
17 Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, 
p. 13. 
16 
The fall of g~ain prices in the 1820's ~nd poor 
harvests between 1835-40 put pressure upon the B·altic 
Barony to turn farm land into more profitable pasture 
land for livestock. 18 Consequently great numbers of 
the peasantry were pushed off their land and deprived 
of their livelihood. The mass riots which resulted 
caused general unrest and led Tsar Nicholas I to order 
investigations. These culminat~d in the implementation 
of the Peasant Law of 1849. Enacted for a probationary 
period of six years its main objective wa$ to return 
social stability to rural areas by creating a class of 
small land holders. 
The Peasant Law of 1849 once again ensured that 
land remained the property of the Baltic Barons. 
Accordingly they could no longer dispose of 
agricultural land other than through sale or lease to 
members of the rural community. 19 A provision of the 
law furthermore eliminated corvee labor and stipulated 
payment for land leases in money only. 20 Hopes of the 
Baltic Barons to undermine such conditions were lost 
when Tsar Alexander II re-confirmed The Peasant Law in 
18 Bilmanis, p. 226. 
~" IY Ibid. , p. 228. 
20 Ibid. , p. 228. 
17 
' 
1856. When the Russian Greit Reform Bill of 1861 
abolished serfdom in all of Russia the tide of history 
was irrevocably reversed for the Latvian peasantry. 
Even so, the Baltic Barons had the advantage of 
both education and economic power and were still able 
to renew their tenuous grip on the peasantry. In 
accordance with the laws of emancipation, manor-lords 
could appoint and remove at will mayors and judges in 
their area of jurisdiction even though these had been 
freely elected by members of the local rural community. 
The manor-lord was the chief of police, held the keys 
to the treasury, issued passports, and could grant or 
decline permission to leave the area.
21 
And yet, in spite of efforts by the Barony to use 
the emancipation laws to its own advantage, the same 
laws also became the foundation for future 
institutional and legal changes toward Latvian self-
assertion. Now able to become actively 1 involved in , 
local affairs, the Latvian peasantry gained a measure 
of experience which nourished the development of its 
21 Bilmanis, A History of Latvia, p. 226. 
18 
national consciousness and taught it how to conduct its 
own affairs. 22 
Beginning in 1857 the peasantry was free to elect 
its own elders, councils and courts following the total 
removal of the Baltic Barons guardianship. 23 After 
1863, following the implementation of a new passport 
system, the peasantry was free to move from place to 
place or even abroad. 24 And in 1865 the remaining 
vestiges of corvee labor were abolished, as was the use 
of corporal punishment for tenant farmers. 25 
The establishment of special financial 
institutions followed soon thereafter and enabled the 
peasantry to buy land. A Farmer's Mortgage Bank, 
organized by the former overlords, offered mortgages at 
four percent but proved less popular than The Bank of 
Landed Nobles with its higher interest rate of six 
22 Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, p. 109. 
(See also Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 294.) 
23 Spekke, History of Latvia, (Stockholm: 
M. Goppers, 1951), p. 294. 
24 , Ibid., p. 229. 
25 , Ibid., p. 229. 
19 
percent. The peasantry it would seem simply wanted 
nothing to do with their past masters. 26 
The movement toward land acquisition launched in 
the 1860's retained its momentum well into the next 
~entury. For example, in the Latvian northern Vidzeme 
district, by 1~05 about 87% of the farms had been sold 
to the farmers themselves, and by 1912 had reached 
90%. 27 When Latvian national independence was at last 
achieved in 1918, the Latvian peasantry owned more than 
half of all agricultural land. 
The emergence of an agrarian rural class was 
paralleled by the formation of a Latvian urban middle 
and working class as a consequence of the rapid 
indus-.rial growth and development which characterized 
late nineteenth century Russia. As alluded to earlier, 
the Crimean War played an important role in 
accelerating this development. The Black Sea blockade 
effectively forced the bulk of Russia's import-export 
trade to be channeled through the northerrl Balt.ic port 
city of Riga. This in turn influenced the rise of a 
Latvian middle-class of prospering merchants, 
26 • 1 . B1 man1s, p. 229. 
27 Spekke, p. 308. 
20 
,_ 
importers, bankers and shipowners.
28 The Trade Guilds, 
which historically had excluded Latvians unless
 they 
renounced their nationality, were opened to Lat
vian 
membership in 1866.
29 
The number of Latvian industrial workers grew 
from about 2,000 workers employed in forty six 
factories in 1840 to ninety factories with. 6,00
0 
wbrkers in 1864. By 1874, the numbers had incr
eased 
dramatically to 142 factories wfth over 12,000 
workers, 
and by 1887 the industrial work force topped 14
8,00o. 30 
The rapid expansion of their combined purchasin
g power 
significantly accelerated growth in all sectors
 of the 
Latvian economy. 
The industrial progress of the Baltics' Latvian
 
Province was unsurpassed in all of the Russian 
Empire. 
In 1851 factories in the capital city of Riga w
ere 
producing over 2 million rubles worth of goods.
31 To 
transmit shipping news, th~ first telegraph lin
e in the 
Russian Empire was installed in 1852 between Ri
ga and 
the mouth of the Daugava River at Ustj-Dvinsk. In 1868 
28 Bilmanis, p. 241. 
29 Spekke, p. 308. 
30 • Ibid., p. 308. 
31 Bilmanis; p. 240. 
21 
the Riga-Jelgava railway was opened and followed, in 
1872, by the completion of an iron railway bridge over 
the Daugava River which by 1889 made possible the Riga-
Pskov-st. Petersburg railway link-up. 32
 
.Electricity 
was introduced in Riga in 1887. By 1904 it could boast 
a modern water supply system. 33 
The development of a growing Latvian national 
self-awareness, and t~e emergence of a Latvian 
intell.igentsia as its. advocate, paralleled th.is 
economic and agrarian revolution. It was an 
i 
\ 
"awakening" nourished by an educational system which as 
pointed out, for all of the Latvian regions excepting 
portions of Latgale, owed a formative influence to the 
German Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Herrnhuter 
Brethren (the German Moravian Church) arriving in the 
wake of the Reformation. 34 Why the eastern region of 
Latgale remained an exception is not difficult to 
ascertain. Incorporated for these two hundred crucial 
years (1559-1772) into the Grand Duchy of Poland and 
Lithuania, was under the influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church blocking the penetration of Protestant 
32 Ibid. , p~ 240. 
33 Ibid., P· 240. 
34 Ibid., p. 240. 
22 
stimuli. As a borderland, it was furthermore also 
molded differently by the Russian Orthodox rite 
introduced by its eastern neighbor. 
The sponsorship of the missions of the Moravian 
Brethren began in 1738 with the opening of a teachers 
semi.nary to train Latvian preachers. 35 Although the 
Moravian missions lasted for only twenty years before 
support by the increasingly concerned German Barony was 
withdrawn, it lasted long enough to create the first 
ranks of a native Latvian intelligentsia. In 
accordance with their beliefs, the Brethren had taught 
the concept of full equality of man in the eyes of God 
and also advocated free election of the ministers of 
the church, as well as compulsory primary education. 36 
All these aspirations were to be mirrored later in such 
fundamental characteristics of Latvian national 
feelings as the sense of brotherhood, co-operation in 
the community, and stress upon the value of 
education. 37 
Under the enlightened auspices of Catherine the 
Great, the first Latvian parish schools opened their 
35 , Ibid., p. 236. 
36 Bilmanis, p. 235. 
(See also Spekke, p. 281.) 
37 Ibid., p. 237. 
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doors in 1765, complete with primers written in 
Latvian. 38 By the end of the eighteenth century, 
Latvian illiteracy stood at only thirty-seven percent. 
The Latvian sense of self-esteem, enjoying for the 
first time in centuries the use of Latvian as a 
language in schools and churches, received an important 
boost. 39 
The Bill of 1817-1~, which first abolished 
serfdom., had included an addendum providing for the 
founding of rural elementary schools. Local popular 
support then enjoyed by the Moravian Brethren induced 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church to reassess its own 
position, culminating in measures which led to Lutheran 
sponsorship of parish schools. In 1833 the first 
official normal schoo.l was opened in the western 
Kurzeme region of Latvia. Its early graduates became 
rural elementary school teachers. In 1834, a teacher's 
institute was founded in Kurzeme~ Beginning in 1849, a 
rural education law mandated parish school boards 
composed of the pastor, a teacher, and one farmer of 
each rural community under the supervision of each 
district school board. 
38 , Ibid., p. 237. 
Ibid., p. 237. 
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The first center for advanced study in Latvia was 
founded in 1861 as the Riga Polytechnical Institute. It 
had five departments: Chemistry, Agriculture, 
Engineering, Commerce, and Architecture. Re-organized 
during the tim·e of Latvian independence, it became the 
University of Latvia in 1918. 
The ancient and historic capital city of Riga 
became the focal point of Latvian national 
consciousness with the Riga Latvian (Lettonia) 
Association, founded in 1868, as the galvanizing center 
for all.Latvian nationalist activities. Similar 
organizations were soon formed in the Latvian provinces 
and membership rose into the thousands. 40 
The Riga Latvian Association was instrumental 
also in the formation of the first Latvian Singing 
Festival in 1873, which featured the presentation of 
the Latvian National Anthem "Dievs Sveti Latviju" (God 
Bless Latvia)· and many other nationalist-related 
projects. Included were the publication of newspapers, 
translations of foreign works, advocacy of the 
, t t ' t , t 41 th in eres s of Latvian pe·asan -propr ie ors, · e 
40 , Ibid., p. 244. 
41 Edward c. Thaden, "Baltic National Movements 
during the Nineteenth Century," Journal of 
Baltic studies, Vol.16, No.4, (1985): p. 416. 
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publication of a Latvian encyclopedia, the inception of 
a Latvian national theater and lyric opera, and 
sponsorship of various worthy literary and musical 
projects. 42 
Until the 1890's a general feeling of harmony 
prevailed among Latvian intellectuals since virtually 
all were focusing their concerns upon the furthering of 
Latvia's national awakening. 43 But the social and 
economic changes unfolding during the nineteenth 
century also were dramatically affecting L~tvian life 
in other ways. As farmers, merchants and manufacturers 
melded into a bourgeoisie, a radical element also 
deVel~ped in reaction against it within the 
proletariat. 44 When the nineteenth century drew to its 
close, it was clear that a fledgling political 
consciousness, organized along political party lines 
clearly demarcated by social class distinctions was in 
existence. 45 
The "Jauna Strava" (New Current or New Wave), was 
a political movement formed in the 1890's which 
42 Bilmanis, History of Latvia, p. 244. 
43 Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, 
p. 17. 
44 , Ibid. , p. 17 . 
45 , Ibid. , p. 1 7 . 
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attracted membership from all social classes through 
its newspaper, "Dienas Lapa" (Daily N·ews) . "Dienas 
Lapa" discussed politically inspirational but 
potentially volatile subjects, including the rights of 
man, political freedom, parliamentary democracy, and 
the French Revolution. 46 The zealous Russ·ification 
efforts pursued by Tsar Alexander III toward the end of 
the nineteenth century became a common denominator of 
the concerns espoused in the political demands of the 
"Jauna Strava" to the point of helping overshadow the 
intrinsic differences which were emerging among the 
many nationally conscious Latvians. 
In 1889, the "Jauna Strava" was driven 
underground following the great Riga strike for which 
tsarist authorities held the group responsible. Many 
of its leaders were forced into exile, especially in 
Germany, where they soon came under the influence of 
German socialists. As a consequence-the "Jauna 
Strava's" more socialist-inclined members merged with 
other so inclined groups in 1904 to form the Latvian 
Social Democratic Worker's Party (LSDWP). 
The LSDWP, as the first group to organize 
politically, was initially composed of industrial and 
46 Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 311. 
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agricultural workers. But after th
e 1905 Russian 
Revolution it too began (as the "Jauna Stra
va" earlier) 
to attract members from other class
es resenting both 
the Russian Empire's intensifying a
ttempts at 
Russification and the protection of
 the privileged 
status of the Baltic Barons.
47 As a movement it 
carried from its very inception Lat
vian nationali~t 
overtones and displayed definite an
ti-Russian and anti-
German sentiments which contradicte
d the supposedly 
internationalist spirit of Marxism.
 Even so, in 1906, 
following the failure of the 1905 R
ussian Revolution, 
it affiliated with the Russian Soci
al Democratic 
Workers' Party (RSDWP) realizing that witho
ut broader 
collaboration any future revolution
 was doomed to 
failure. The idea of collaboration
 with the Russian 
party had become acceptable because
 the RSDWP had 
signalled its own readiness to conc
ede the LSDWP's 
demand for the preservation of each
 party's nationa·1 
autonomy. 
The urban bourgeoisie, elements of 
which were 
loosely represented within the Latv
ian Constitutional 
·oemocratic Party formed in 1905, res
ponded to the 1905 
Russian Revolution by initially sup
porting reactionary 
47 Ibid., p. 313. 
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aspirations before settling upon support' of a monarchy 
and the status quo. 48 Others, aligned within the 
liberal-democratic camp, advocated nationalist goals. 
But the spread of democratic nationalism through any of 
these groups was slow to reach the general Latvian 
population in measurable terms. Except for their left-
wing factions, these groups generally lacked effective 
structure and were little more than electioneering 
, t, 49 
.organ1za ions. 
-That the 1905 Russian Revolution was an important 
watershed in the development of Latvian national 
consciousness is clear. 50 The revolutionary fervor 
which then convulsed the Russian Empire began in St. 
Petersburg, but it had immediately found its cdrollary 
in such actions as the sympathy march staged by factory 
workers in Riga. When the events of Bloody Sunday 
induced the LSDWP to call for a general strike, it 
became an enormous success. With well over 100,000 
participants it sparked a revolution which, in Latvia, 
developed into a nationalist uprising with pitched 
battles in the countryside between the peasantry and 
48 Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, 
p. 39. 
49 Sprudzs and Rusis, Res Baltica, p. 29. 
50 Spekke, A History of Latvia, p. 42. 
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its dual nemeses, the Baltic Germans and the 
Russians. 51 By the beginning of Dede~ber, the Baltic 
Provinces had ~eported 184 houses torched and eighty-
two Baltic Germans murdered. 52 This national turmoil, 
which by October, 1905 had also taken on some of the 
characteristics of an old~style peasant revolt led to 
the formation of the Latvian Central Feder~tiv~ 
Committee in Riga. Since it received support by both 
the left and right factions of the LSDWP and enjoyed 
generally universal Latvian national acceptance, this 
Committee may be regarded as the first physical 
manifestation of the kind of Latvian national thought 
which was to receive concrete realization in Latvian 
statehood. 53 
The revolutionary activities which had strangled 
the Russian Empire, especially during the railway 
strike, had forced Tsar Nicholas II to acquiesce to 
Russian reformist demands and issue the October 
Manifesto of 1905. This, in turn, had opened the door 
to real reform demands for Latvians as well. One 
51 Bruno Kalnins, "The Social Democratic Movement 
in Latvia," in Revolution and Politics in Russia, 
ed. Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972, p. 137. 
52 ; Von Rauch, The Baltic States, p. 14. 
53 I Ibid., p. 266. 
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consequence was the call for the election of a local 
Latvian constituent assembly planting the first seeds. 
from which Latvian national independence was to grow. 
Clamors for reform came from all members of 
society, with congresses becoming the major element of 
organization. The two months following the October 
Manifesto allowed all areas of Latvia to experience 
real freedom for the first time. Rallies organized in 
Riga by the LSDWP attracted thousands. Freedom of the 
press and association prevailed. General elections 
were held based upon universal suffrage, including 
women. Free trade unions were organized. School 
teachers declared their solidarity with the socialists, 
demanded Latvian as the language to be used in schools, 
and the separation of church and state.
54 Latvian 
Lutheran pastors met for a synodical conference to 
elaborate upon a Latvian program of reforms.
55 When in 
December 1905 the nearly 600 assembled delegates from 
rural communes favored such dynamic and radical 
agrarian reforms as the redistribution of manor lands 
among the landless, 56 Latvia in essence had become 
54 Ibid., p. 266. 
55 Ibid., p. 266. 
56 Ibid., p. 267. 
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self-governing. However, by then the tsarist mil·itary 
forces had also managed to bring the revolution in 
Russia under sufficient contrbl to be able to redirect 
their attention toward the errant Baltic Provinces. 
The punitive measures whic~ followed brought the full 
~ight of· the Russian Empire, supported by the Baltic-
Germans, into the effort to rout real or imagined 
Latvian revolutionaries well into 1906-07. The 
execution of more than 2,000 Latvians,. the deportations 
of even larger numbers, and the reinstatement of the 
Baltic Germans to the positions they had previously 
held saw to it that this short-lived interlude of 
Latvian freedom was crushed. 57 But it could not dam 
the nationalist current which continued to flow toward 
independence. 
Native Latvians were elected to represent their 
Province in the first Russian Duma in 1906 and 
continued to serve in all three subsequent Dumas. 
Politically moderate, they limited their demands to 
advocating changes in the agrarian structure such as 
the abolition of privileges for large landowners and 
fairer distribution of landownership. Although Duma 
57 , Ibid., p. 268. 
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representatives, they had no real power. 58 Their 
participation in the parliamentary process, however, 
was valuable as a lesson in practical political 
experience and democratic methods. Last, but certainly 
not least, the fact that even a member of the LSDWP 
central committee could succeed in winning a seat in 
the generally more radical Second State Duma clearly 
signalled that the Latvian revolutionary spirit had 
also managed to survive politically in the electoral 
competition. But it required the chaos of World War I 
and the collapse of Imperial Russia to bring about the 
creation of an independent Latvia internationally 
recognized as a sovereign state. 
The First World War, when it began in 1914, was 
originally met in Latvia with the same popular 
enthusiasm as elsewhere in the Russian Empire. Germany 
·,, 
was the enemy, and for Latvians, ·in light of their 
historic subordination to the Baltic German Barons, it 
., 
was initially easy to identify with the Russian cause. 
The Latvian Duma Deputy, Janis Goldmanis, supported by 
members of the liberal-democratic groups, obtained the 
permission of the Russian government to organize the 
58 J. Rutkis, Latvia: Country and People, 
{Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), 
p. 218. 
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Latvian volunteer units which gained fame as the 
Latvian Riflemen Battalions or Regiments. Created in 
1915 and soon over 40,000 men in strength, they fought 
heroically for the defense of Latvia and received 
worldwide press recognition. Carrying the first 
official Latvian flag, red-white-red stripes, these 
Latvian Riflemen significantly contributed to the 
growth of Latvian national pride, especially since much 
of the war was fought on Latvian ~oil. That they lost 
the city of Riga to the Germans in September 1917, and 
that the battle lines stabilized in the southern 
Latvian area of Vidzeme and remained essentially 
unchanged until February 1918 made little or no 
difference. 
The Latvian Refugee ·Supply Organization formed 1n 
St. Petersburg, also ln 1915, and ably assisted the 
Russian war effort by providing assistance a large 
~· 
number of Latvians refugees. Although iritended solely 
as a charitable support organization, its associate 
chapters throughout Latvia also became important 
rallying centers for Latvian nationalists. By the 
middle of the war it was obvious that Latvian autonomy 
J 
had become a minimal demand for a segment of Latvia's 
democratically-inclined intelligentsia, whic6 counted 
two Latvian members of the Russian Duma among its 
34 
strongest advocates. Two conferences were held in 1916 
in Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) on this· subject 
with politicians, publicists and artists as their 
sponsors. A majority of those in attendance went as 
far as to favor complete state autonomy. 59 It was 
resolved to organize a Latvian National Committee in 
Switzerland for the purpose of popularizing the idea 
and making it an international concern. Throughout 
Latvia, newspapers and journals were meanwhile 
encouraging ·nationalism and demanding autonomy at home. 
The collapse of the Russian autocratic state in 
February, and the emergence of a Russian provisional 
government in search of a new political ord~r in March 
1917, made possible the convening of the congress known 
as the Vidzeme Land Assembly. It met in southern 
Latvia at the town of Valmiera, with assembly meetings 
held in the Latvian areas of Latgale and Kurzeme. The 
assemblies, totaling more than 400 delegates, 
represented the politically moderate elements in 
Latvian society whose objective it was to set up a 
government. Their election o( a forty-eight member 
Provisional Council was followed by the·call for its 
installation as replacement for the old Provincial Diet 
59 Sprudzs and Rusis, Latvia: Country and People, 
p. 31. 
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and the establishment of Latvia as a region which would 
include southern Livonia, ~entral Courland, and eastern 
Latgal~. Although it gained recognition by the Russian 
Provisional Government as the official governing body 
of Latvia, it was denied recognition .. by the LSDWP on 
the grounds that it had been sponsored by assemblies 
disproportionately composed of landowners. The Latvian 
Bolsheviks had formed their own councils in the spring 
of 1917, mostly composed of workers' and soldiers' 
committees. Bot there also was a council of landless 
peasants in emulation of the Russian Bolshevik pattern. 
In answer to the formation of the Provisional Council 
at Valmiera, the Bolsheviks set up their Provisional 
Council under the auspices of a special committee for 
the landless which they called the Congress of Landless 
Deputies. Composed of delegates representing groups of 
farm workers, artisans and teachers, it proceeded to 
pass its own resolutions concerning Latvian autonomy. 
Following negotiations, the two councils merged into 
one body tentatively accepted as the Provisional 
Vidzeme Land Council. 
The Russian Provisional government decided that 
it could not continue to ignore these Latvian 
maneuverings for political autonomy and on July 5, 1917 
it issu~d a decree permitting the organization of a 
36 
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Latvian administration subordinated to the Russian 
Provisional Government's Commissar of Provinces. 
Accordingly, a temporary Provisional Council was to be 
. . . ~ . 
elected from the districts, and elections were to be 
held in September. But when the moderate political 
tenor of the new Provincial Council changed with the 
onset of the Kerensky military offensive during the 
summer of 1917, it placed the Bolsheviks in an ideal 
position to advance their power in Latvia. The dismal 
failure of the Kerensky offensive lent itself to 
Bolshevik exploitation of the already heightened public 
sentiment against the war and to publicize Bolshevik 
politics in one appealing slogan calling for "Peace, 
Bread and Land". 
The municipal elections held in early August 1917 
gave the Bolsheviks large majorities in many areas 
within both occupied and unoccupied Latvia. In the 
subsequent elections to the Provincial Council, the 
Bolsheviks secured a sixty per~ent majority. Much of 
their success, however, was derived from the 
~ 
overwhelming support they had received from the Latvian 
army, which was by then heavily Bolshevized. 
As the October Revolution of 1917 swept across 
Russia all power in Latvia passed to the Bolsheviksa 
In response to the events of the October Revolution and 
37 
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to the subsequent November elections wh!ch re-affirmed 
Bolshevik support, the Latvian political moderates 
joined together in the formation of the non-Bolshevik 
Latvian Refugee committee which worked for the 
promotion of a Latvian National Committee. 
interim the LSDWP completely split into 
In the 
Bolshevik/Menshevik factions, following th~ example of 
the RSDWP. 
The newly formed Latvian National Committee 
convened in November at the Latvian town of Valka. r·t 
was composed of twenty-six representatives from 
thirteen different organizat-ions. 6° Foremost among the 
resolutions passed was the right of the Latvian people 
to determine their own future. When the Council of 
People's Commissars in Petrograd, to which the 
resolutions were referred, rejected both the 
resolutions and the Council, the Latvian National 
Committee ignored the rejections and convened for a 
second time in December, moving to assume supreme power 
in Latvia. In support of its drive toward Latvian 
independence, the Council looked toward developing ties 
with western allies. Under its directive, a Foreign 
60 Von Rauch, The Baltic States. The Years of 
Independence, p. 37. 
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Relations Section addressed declarations to Germ~y and 
the Allied Powers insisting up6n the Latvian people's 
absolute right to determine their own fate. Ukraine, 
Poland, Finland, and the two other emerging Baltic 
States, Estonia and Lithuania, had already declared 
their independence earlier iri November. 
In December 1917, German-Soviet peace 
negotiations commenced to take the Soviet Union out of 
World War I. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ended 
the war between Soviet Russia and Germany, was signed 
on March 3, 1918. It provided for the division of 
Latvia between Germany and the Soviet Union. The 
western area, including Kurzeme and Riga, were to come 
under Germ~n control. The eastern Latvian region of 
Latgale was ceded to the Soviet Union. However, a 
supplementary agreement was added to the treaty in 
August. In it the Soviet government renounced all 
claims to Latvia and Estonia, given that in the 
tumultuous conditions of the times it had inadequate 
resources to maintain a Baltic presence. 
When in the spring of 1918 the German army 
occupied all of Latvia, it had freed it from Bolshevik 
rule but also blocked the Latvian National Council from 
influencing national events. The Council consequently 
intensified its efforts to convince the Allies to 
39 
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recognize its declaration of Latvia's independence. 
But by early fall the Soviet Government had repudiated 
its peace agreement with Germany and the Red Army, 
supported by units of Bolshevised Latvian light 
infantry, invaded Latvia and fciught there throughout 
the winter. The Latvian National Council, re-organized 
to include members of the Democratic Bloc in order to 
form the "Latvijas Tautas Padome" (Latvian People's 
Council), decreed itself to be the provisional 
government and proclaimed Latvian independence on 
November 18, 1918. Latvia, it declared, was an 
independent democratic republic whose final form of 
government would be determined by a Constituent 
Assembly. 
Riga castle, built by the German Knights of the 
Sword and historic home to later Swedish and Russian 
governors of Latvia, was selected as the residence of 
the provisional government's new President. The by 
then famous red-white-red striped flag of the Latvian 
regiments became the national flag. A coat of arm~ was 
chosen which combined the emblems of two Latvian 
provinces, the Livonian Griffin and the Lion of 
Courland. By this choice of state symbols the 
provisional government symbo.lically affirmed Latvia's 
ancient heritage and claimed a historic right to self-
40 
.. 
determination. The earlier efforts of the C
ouncil to 
develop diplomatic ties on behalf of Latvia 
had already 
induced Great Britain to recognize de facto t
he 
existence of the new Latvian state on Novem
ber 11, 
1918. It was hoped that other recognitions, 
would soon 
follow. But the so-called War of Liberation 
which the 
Bolsheviks pursued in Latvia resulted in the 
fall of 
Riga in December 1918. This was followed wit
h the 
announced formation, on December 14th, of an 
independent Soviet Republic of Latvia. Not 
~surprising!~, the new Latvian Soviet constit
ution which 
was proclaimed for the Latvian Soviet Republ
ic differed 
very little from the Soviet constitution, ex
cept that 
in deference to Latvia's more highly develope
d economy 
the Latvian Bolsheviks reserved for themselv
es the 
right of autonomy in matters of domestic pol
icies. 
Initially the Latvian Bolshevik government 
benefitted from public support given it by p
eople who 
-
believed the German "liberators" to be more o
f a threat 
than the Soviets. The Bolshevik terror comm
itted in 
the name of the "World Revolution", however, 
soon 
eroded native Latvian support. In addition, 
the 
Bolshevik advance in the Baltics had greatly 
heightened 
German fears that the Soviet Union would beco
me its 
geographic neighbor and be able to lend supp
ort to 
41 
revolutionary elements in Germany. In the spring of 
1919, Germany was j·oined by Latvian native militia and 
therefore able to launch an offensive which succeeded 
in reversing the advantages which the Bolsheviks held 
in the Baltics. In January 1920, following almost 
another year of sporadic fighting, the Latvians, now 
assisted by Estonian and Polish military forces, 
succeeded in pushing the Bolshevik forces completely 
out of Latvia. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FRUITION-PERIOD OF LATVIAN INDEPENDENCE 
Latvia, free to t~ke its place among the world's 
family of sovereign states, joined the League of 
Nations on September 22, 1920. The ·weimar German 
Republic, which had emerged in the aftermath of WWI, 
acknowledged Latvia de jure on July 15, 1920. On 
January 26, 1921, de jure recognition was also accorded 
the young state by Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Belgium and Japan. United States recognition of Latvia 
was at last also granted on July 28, 1922 under the 
-~, 4'/ 
auspices of the new Hoover administration. 
Surprisingly, President Wilson had been reluctant to 
recognize any of the new states carved out of the 
, t , 61 Sovie Union. 
The Soviet Union had come to terms with Latvia on 
August 11, 1920. The Soviet-Latvian Peace Treaty, 
~ 
called the Treaty of.Riga, unreservedly recognized the 
independence and sovereignty of Latvia and renounced 
any historical claims to it on the part of the Soviet 
Union. Included also in the Treaty were provisions 
6111 Recognizes Baltic States," The New York Times, 28 July 1922, 
sec. B, p. 6. 
43 
which dealt with such economic concerns as war 
.. 
reparations, return of goods, counter claims, the 
repatriation of people and the retracirtg of the borders 
" 
between the two states. 
Latvia's new leadership believed that it would 
lessen the risk of future Soviet aggression if it 
pursued a policy of good will toward the Soviet Union 
in areas of mutual interest. 62 Indeed, at that time 
the world in general believed the Soviet Union to be 
satisfied with this peace treaty, especially since the 
new Soviet government had announced that it did not 
blame Latvia for its struggle against it. The Soviet 
Union's declared position was that all Baltic States 
were but captive bourgeois tools for subversion by the 
Entente. 63 
The Soviet Union realized that the Russian 
Empire's national resources and manpower had been 
exhausted by its involvement in WWI and the Russian 
Civil War. The Soviet Union therefore felt ill-
equipped to pursue attempts to regain the Baltic area. 
In any case, the world socialist revolution was 
62 Bilmanis, p. 39. 
63 Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Foreign Policy Toward 
The Baltic States, 1918-1940, (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 
p. 59. 
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expected to be close at hand and a duplicitous foreign 
policy toward the Baltic States was believed to serve 
the more immediate needs of Soviet foreign policy. 
This explains why the Soviet government, while 
supporting all efforts to subvert the newly formed 
Baltic state governments, also simultaneously moved 
publicly to stabilize relations with them and worked 
hard to ensure the neutrality of its new neighbors. 
The Baltic States were to serve as a "cordon sanitare", 
or protective barrier, between the Soviet Union and the 
West. 
As could be expected, the new Republic of Latvia 
faced serious problems. Its region was exhausted by 
I 
years of war. Its ihdustrial base was decimated, in 
part because much of the industrial production capacity 
had been re-located during WWI to the Russian interior 
for safeguarding. Agricultural land had remained 
fallow for several seasons. The urban and rural 
population in. 1920 was ·estimated to be 1.35 million 
half of what it had been before WWT. 64 But more than 
. 
100,000 of the Latvian refugees were repatriated from 
M Von Rauch, The Baltic States, p. 82. 
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the Soviet Union following the peace settlement, and by 
1935 Latvia's population was to reach 1.47 million. 65 
On the domestic scene the Provisional Latvian 
Government's first responsibility had been to address 
the immediate problems of shaping the state's political 
institutions. The first freely elected Latvian 
Constituent Assembly met on May 1, 1920. A 
constitution was adopted on January 21, 1921 providing 
for the separation of church and state and a single-
chamber parliament, or "Saeima", numbering one hundred 
members with universal and equal franchise based upon 
direct and secret ballots under conditions of 
proportional regional representation. The constitution 
was not only based upon the principle of popular vote, 
but also provided for popular initiative by allowing 
for the submission of bills of law directly from the 
people. The past President of the National Council, 
Janis Cakste, was elected President both of the 
Assembly and of Latvia. Karlis Ulmanis, leader of the 
Farmer's Union, became premier. One of the Assembly's 
first measures was to dissolve the Provincial Diet of 
the Baltic Barony. 
} 
I 
65 Von Rauch, p. 82. 
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Full freedom of religion was recognized. 
According to a Church Law passed in 1934, any group of 
fifty· or more could henceforth form a denomination. 
Ten or more denominations were to be recognized as 
:national religious associations. All religions came 
under the province of the Department of Religious 
Affairs. In 1938 more than fifty-five percent of 
\ 
Latvians were Evangelical Lutheran, about twenty-five 
percent Roman Catholic, les~ than nine percent Greek 
Orthodox, barely six percent Russian Old Believers and 
about five percent Jewish. Ministers and priests were 
by this time overwhelmingly native Latvians. 66 But 
since a substantial percentage of Lutheran or Roma.n 
Catholic ethnic Latvians were educated under conditions 
in which the influence of the western-oriented 
religions prevailed, the accession to power of native 
Latvians confirmed once again that the Latvian people 
were to remain essentially western-oriented. 
A new currency, the "lats", was introduced and 
based upon the gold standard. All natural resources as 
well as the railways and public utilities were either 
owned by the government or by the municipality where 
66 , · Ibid., p. 377. 
47 
they were located .. 67 The government also declared its 
willingness to assume responsibility for those areas of 
the economy in which deficiencies could not be 
regenerated through the investment of private capital. 
But private initiative was to be encouraged by the 
government through the extension of long-term mortgages 
and inexpensive state credits. 68 
As a consequence of a law passed by the first 
Saeima in 1922, which allowed any group of five or more 
to call themselves a political party, a vast number of 
political parties and all shades of political opinion 
competed for recognition. Their number eventually 
stood at twenty-two. Among the larger parties in these 
early 1920's were the extremely conservative Christian 
Nationalists, the Centrists, the Latvian 
Farmers' (Peasants') Union, the somewhat left Democratic 
Center Party, and the Social-Democrats, the largest and 
leading left-wing party. 
Four Saeimas met during Latvian statehood. But 
the prevailing political pluralism necessitated 
government by coalitions which, in turn, spefled 
·-' 
governmental instability; and in 1934, Premier Karlis 
67 Spekke, p. 374. 
~ Bilmanis, p. 335. 
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Ulmanis and the Minister of War, General Janis Balodis, 
seized control of the government, dissolved the Saeima 
and all political parties. The installation of the 
moderately authoritarian regime which followed was 
generally accepted as a temporary measure and received 
the confidence of most Latvians. During the early 
thirties the world's grave economic state also 
seriously affected the Latvian economy, but efforts 
undertaken by the Ulmanis/Balodis regime contributed 
constructively to successful management of Latvia's 
depression. 69 
One problem confronting Latvia was that as a 
consequence of sovereignty its once favored economic 
relationship with the Soviet Union had vanished. The 
Latvian economy was now re-organized to attract the 
markets of Western Europe, including Great Britain and, 
to a lesser degree, North America. The largest 
employer of urban labor was the metal goods industry, 
followed by the wood-working, food-producing and 
textile industries. 70 To revitalize them required 
large capital infusions and the cash poor government 
quite logically turned to Latvia's historically strong 
~ Von Rauch, p. 160-161. 
70 • Ibid., p. 125. 
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agricultural sector in its search for help as it sought 
to restore economic growth. 
The dramatic agrarian reform program of 1922 had 
abolished the large Baronial estates still in existence 
and divided the land into parcels of a maximum thirty 
hectares for distribution among the landless without 
affecting the land acquired by the former serfs during 
tsarist times. Whereas in 1897 landowners had composed 
about forty percent of the Latvian population, the 
figure by 1930 had risen to nearly seventy-seven 
percent. 71 This unprecedented growth of the new class 
of small landowners fostered self-esteem and a sense of 
Latvian citizenship in addition to the hoped for 
economic renewal. 
After 1933, growth in the agricultural sector was 
so impressive that Latvia was self-suff icie.nt in wheat, 
rye, and oats. By 1935, twenty percent more land was 
under cultivation than during the immediate pre-war 
years. Yields per acre also increased. Stock-farming 
grew proportionately as well, meeting the demands of 
both the domestic and export market in dairy and meat 
products. Important agricultural exports included 
71 Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 3 64. 
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grains such as flax and clover-seed, as w
ell as meats, 
butter, eggs, and furs.n 
It was the government's intention for La
tvia to 
become as totally self-sufficient as poss
ible. To 
encourage renewal of the industrial base, 
the 
government had also promoted the growth o
f small and 
medium-sized factories and industries.n 
Early 
industries concentrated on infrastructure 
and the 
production of goods to support domestic n
eeds. For 
example, one enterprise re-built dock fac
ilities. 
Another saw to it that the export of timb
er provided 
the government with much of the capital t
o pay for 
imported goods. 74 Beginning with approxim
ately 1,430 
industrial concerns which employed over 6
1,000 people 
in 1920, Latvia had more than 5,7o·o indus
trial concerns 
in 1937 with over 205,000 workers.
75 Even so, for all 
intents and purposes agriculture continued
 to remain 
the foundation of the national economic b
ase during 
Latvian independence. The period of unpre
cedented 
growth between 1923 and 1938 deserves to b
e credited to 
72 Spekke, p. 364-365. 
n Von Rauch, The Baltic States, p. 125. 
74 Rutkis, p. 239. 
75 Von Rauch, p. 125. 
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Latvia's own national efforts. It was not the result 
of foreign credits, 76 notwithstanding the fact that the 
United States had loaned ov~r five million dollars in 
1926 with a generous repayment schedule into the 
1980's.n As evidenced by the growth of the holdings 
of the Latvian State Bank gold reserves and foreign 
funds, it was a solid achievement. With the lat 
remaihing fairly stable in value, state reserves 
increased from about 32 million lats to nearly 92 
miilion lats.~ 
This extraordinary economic advance, achieved in 
little less than twenty years, also had p~llels in 
other areas of Latvian life. As in the nineteenth 
century, education once again became an avenue to a 
better quality of life. But it also helped strengthen 
the foundations for the further development of national 
pride as displayed in all areas of Latvian culture. 
From its inception in 1919 the government had 
placed such importance upon education that it allocated 
fifteen percent of the state budget to it. The number 
n Bilmanis, p. 334. 
n U.S. Department of State, Treaties And Other 
International Agreements Of The United States 
Of America 1776-1949, vol. 9, p. 521. 
n Spekke, p. 368. 
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of primary schools grew from 864 in
 1920 to over 2,057 
by 1930N and was free but compulso
ry fbr the age 
groups six to fourteen. Tn additio
n, elementary 
schooling was lengthened to six yea
rs. At the 
secondary school level tuition was 
required, but many 
scholarships were also offered. Th
e teachers were paid 
by the state. The curriculum was e
xpanded and 
improved. High school education no
w demanded five 
years of a student's time. But, in
 exchange, upon 
graduation students were eligible f
or enrollmentin an 
university, a vocational school, o
r a technical school. 
The professions of teacher, pastor
, agronomist, and 
physician became, in descending ord
er, the most popular 
career choices. 
80 
. 
L 
A national university which was es
tablished in 
1919 when the former Riga Polytech
nic Institute was re-
organized as the University of Latv
ia. In its first 
year it had attracted over 900 stud
ents taught by its 
110 teachers. 81 By 1933 its studen
t body had increased 
to over 8,500. 82 Between 1919 and 1
940 the University 
N Von Rauch, p. 131. 
80 Bilmanis, p. 371. 
81 Von Rauch, p. 131. 
82 • Tb 1 d • , p . 13 2 . 
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of Latvia graduated a total of 9,209 students. 
Initially dependent upon foreign teachers, especially 
Germans, the university faculty grew to include native 
Latvian scholars. Adult education was also encouraged 
' through the development of fourteen people's 
universities and branches. 
Other noteworthy developments in education had 
their corollary in cultural developments. The State 
Academy for the Arts in Riga was designed to teach all 
the applied arts, especially ceramics. The State 
Conservatory of Music became responsible for teaching 
musicians who worked in the churches, musical 
organizations, or the State Opera House. The State 
Historical Institute became the foundation for the 
future Latvian Academy of Sciences. There was also an 
Academy of Agriculture. 83 In net result, Latvia, by 
its own efforts, very rapidly achieved distinction in 
all areas of the nation's academic and cultural life. 
~ . Ibid., p. 372. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOVIET ANNEXATION OF LATVIA 
,ts fate would have it, the period of Latvian 
statehood would be short-lived. As Hitler's Third 
Reich became increasingly militaristic, Latvia and the 
other Baltic States, Lithuania and Estonia, had reason 
for concern. Sandwiched between two totalitarian 
giants, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, they looked 
to foreign policy as a means to protect their 
neutrality and to the League of Nations to ensure their 
sovereignty. Without exception, two intrinsic factors 
played decisive roles: their small size rendered them 
powerless, and their geographic location was, for good 
or ill, a historic transit way to the Baltic Sea and 
deep water ports. Hence, any proposal promising to 
further their national security was welcomed. The 1934 
Treaty of Good Understanding and Cooperation, signed 
between the three states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, is a case in point. It provided for joint 
conferences on concerns of mutual interest. By 
following it the same year with their joint affirmation 
of the so-called "Eastern Locarno", or East European 
Pact of Mutual Assistance, the three states based their 
55 
hopes for neutrality upon promotion of the Rapallo 
initiated rapproachment between Germany and the Soviet 
Union, and upon scrupulous avoidance of special 
agreements with any one great power. In 1936 the 
Baltic states furthermore joined together to form the 
Baltic Entente in collective affirmation of their 
neutrality. 
Earlier, in 1934, the Soviet Union had approached 
each of the states with proposals to conclude bilateral 
commitments to mutual aid in the event of aggression by 
third parties. It was understood that "third party" 
meant Nazi Germany. Hitler's hatred for communism was 
no secret, and his desire to expand German influence to 
the east was already spelled out in Mein Kampf. 
, 
The Soviet Union had initially tried to come to 
terms with Nazi Germany by proposing a Protocol 
advocating that the two powers (Germany and the Soviet 
Union) 
would be guided in their foreign policy by an 
obligation to preserve the independence and 
integrity of the Baltic States and refrain from 
any action capable, directly or indirectly, from 
violating their independence. 84 
~ Joseph I. Vizulis, Nations Under Duress: The 
Baltic States, (Port Washington, NY: Associated 
Faculty Press, 1985), p. 16. 
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But Germany's rejection of the proposal forced the 
Soviet Union to seek protection of its security by 
perceptibly more aggressive foreign policy 
initiatives.~ Andrei Zhdanov, a member of the Soviet 
Central Committee, best illustrated the new tack in 
Soviet foreign policy when he cautioned the Baltic 
States with his ominous comment that, 
it does not pay for little countries to get 
entangled in big adventures, and if fascism dares 
to seek military victories on the northwest 
frontier of the Soviet Union, then we in 
Leningrad, placing at the services of defense all 
the technical strength we can command, shall deal 
it such a crushing blow that the enemy will never 
again turn its eyes on Leningrad. 86 
The circumstances bringing about the forcible 
annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union 
make clear why it was never recognized as legal by the 
majority of nations in the world and why the event 
became such a galvanizing force for nationalism among 
/the Latvian people. 87 The Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement 
~signed on August 23, 1939 which effected annexation 
_/as Vizulis, p. 16. 
86 I Ibid., p. 16. 
87 Saulius Suziedelis, "The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
And The Baltic States: An Introduction And 
Interpretation," Lituanas, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
(1989): p. 39. 
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serves as an unremitting reminder to the Soviet Union 
of past historical indiscretions which must now be 
dealt with. For these reasons the Agreement deserves 
particular attention. Ostensibly a non-aggression 
pact, it was signed by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, and the German Fo~eign 
Minister, Joachim van Ribbentrop; a successful exercise 
in realpolitik. The Soviet Union no .longer had cause 
to fear Nazi Germany as an aggressor threatening her 
western borders, and Nazi Germany was free to implement 
its invasion of Poland by September first with the 
assurance of success because the Pact eliminated all 
furthet hopes for collective action against Nazi 
Germany by the European nations and the Soviet Union. 
The terms of the Pact were quite simple. Its 
high points included an agreement between the 
contracting parties to refrain from any act of 
violence, any aggressive action and any attack on each 
other either severally or jointly with other powers. 
It stressed neutrality for either signatory in case of 
one party's conflict with a third party, as well as 
consultation and arbitration as a means of splving \ 
problems developing between the signatories.\ 
The treaty took force upon signing. It was to 
remain in force for ten years and carried provisions 
58 
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for automatic renewal. But it also had an infamous 
secret addendum which deserves special attention 
because it foreshadowed the end of Latvian 
independence. In defining Soviet and German spheres of 
influence within Eastern Europe, the Protocol provided 
for a fourth partition of Poland, east of the border 
formed by the Narev, Vistula and San rivers, assigned 
areas of Finland, Rumania, Bessarabia, all of Estonia, 
and Latvia and Poland to the Soviet Union. With 
Lithuania assigned to the German sphere, the. Latvian-
Lithuanian border was to become the effective boundary 
between the respective Soviet and G~rman spheres of 
influence. However, an additional secret protocol 
signed on September 28, 1939 also relegated Lithuania 
to the Soviet sphere in exchange for giving Germany the 
province of Lublin and some parts of the province of 
Warsaw. 
Although these secret arrangements were not 
immediately known to them, the Baltic States and the 
world were nevertheless greatly alarmed over the 
signing of the Pact; for the general expectation was 
that it ensured war between Poland and Germany. 88 This 
sense of alarm was soon heightened by rumors, fuelled 
M Suziedelis, p. 27. 
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by the pervasive suspicion within the Baltic diplomatic 
corps, that the announced portions of the. Pact indeed 
did not represent the whole agreement. 89 But the 
Baltic governments' expressed concerns, through 
diplomatic channels, countered by German and Soviet 
governments with assurances that the new Pact would in 
no way affect their sovereignty. 
Concurrent with the signing of the Pact, the 
Soviet Union had also moved to persuade the Estonian 
government to accept a Soviet-Estonian mutual defense 
treaty, but in language which made the request an 
ultimatum rather than a diplomatic overture~ On 
September eighteenth, the escape of a Polish submarine 
detained at the Estonian port of Tallin was used by the 
Soviet government as a pretext to impose its assistance 
upon the Estonian government by assigning the Soviet 
( 
Baltic Fleet the task of protecting the coastline, 
since the Estonian government obviously was incapable 
of doing so. In addition, the Soviet Union claimed 
reason to suspect that Baltic ports were lending aid to 
foreign U-boats. Less than a week after the incident, 
Soviet troops, numbering about 250,000 men, fully 
equipped with artillery, tanks and planes, were massed 
89 • Ibid. , p. 4 7 . 
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along the Soviet Estonian border. 90 The Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov made it clear that if the treaty of 
mutual defense was not signed, the Soviet Union would 
use force. Unable to count on assistance from either 
Germany or the Allied Powers, Estonia accepted and the 
Pact of Defense and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet 
Union was signed on September 28, 1939. Its provisions 
forced the Estonian government to lease tb the Soviet 
Union, for military purposes, all of the Estonian 
islands for a period of five years. In addition, 
Soviet troops were to be stationed in Estonia. 
With the occupation of Estonia accomplished, the 
atvian Foreign Minister was "invited" to Moscow to 
eet with Stalin, who now ·expressed concern about the 
possibility of a Swedish and British threat to the 
Latvian area and its ports. 91 With Estonia's 
sovereignty already aggressively violated and sixteen 
Soviet Army divisions poised at the neighboring Latvian 
border, the implied message was clear. On October 5, 
1939 Latvia also signed a Pact of Mutual .Assistance 
90 Alex Stromas, "Soviet Incorporation Of The Baltic States And Their Incorporation Into The USSR: Political And Legal Aspects," East European Quarte~ly, Vol.19, No.3, (September, 1985), p. 291. 
91 Bilmanis, p. 391. 
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with the Soviet Union, but with the difference that the 
Latvian agreement was to be in effect for ten years and 
that 30,000 Soviet troops would be stationed irt Latvia 
for its "protection". Lithuania followed suit on 
October 10, 1939 after having been advised that failure 
to agree would mean abandonment to Germany. 
Although all three pacts stipulated the 
preservation of the sovereignty of the Baltic nations 
and non-interference by the Soviet government in their 
internal affairs, it was blatantly clear that reality 
would be different. Yet military resistance would have 
been futile. Poland had already been dismembered. 
France and England were at war with Nazi Germany, and 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact made it clear that Germany would 
not interfere. Compliance with Soviet demands, on the 
other hand, might help the Baltic states gain time 
until world fortunes shifted in their favor. Such 
rationalization was buoyed by the argument that the 
Soviet Union had become more civilized since its 
inception and could now be expected to honor its 
treaties. After all, its international prestige was 
much at stake. 92 
92 Rutkis, Latvia: Country And People, p. 245. 
62 
Following the signing of the treaties, the Soviet 
Union moved rapidly to tty to force Finland under its 
protective umbrella. B~t Finland vehemently refused. 
The Russo-Finnish War which followed momentarily 
deflected Soviet attention away from the Baltic states. 
Since the Spring of 1940 was also a period of 
German military successes in Western Europe, it seemed 
that inaction vis-a-vis the three Baltic states was due 
to the Soviet Union's scrupulous observance of its 
agreements, especially since the Soviet government was 
publicly lauding the pacts as models of mutual 
t • 93 coopera ion. The evidence now available makes clear 
that, in fact, preparations for Soviet annexation of 
the Baltic states commenced soon after the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact was signed. Secret Soviet military maps printed 
shortly after the signing of the Pact already showed 
the Baltic states as Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Indeed, on the very day of the signing of the Soviet-
Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Pact, a secret 
instructional paper signed by the Soviet Assistant 
Commissar of the Interior concerning the "The 
Deportation of Anti-Soviet Elements from the Baltic 
Countries" ordered members of the Soviet political 
~ Rutkis, p. 246. 
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police to enter the Baltic countries disguised as 
.military personnel and to prepare lists of Baltic 
natidnals to be deported at a later date.
94 The visas 
which Latvia had been asked to issue to 300 special 
Soviet technicians following the signing of the Pact, 
as was later learned, were for secret police personnel 
sent to establish Soviet secret police centers~
95 
Tensions began to heighten in April and May 1940 
between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union when 
Soviet newspapers launched a press campaign falsely 
accusing the Baltic governments of pro-Allied 
sympathies and co-ordinated conspiracies against the 
Soviet Union. These verbal attacks began with 
Lithuania as the first target. By inference, it was 
accused on May 25, 1940 of being responsible for the 
disappearance of several Soviet soldiers from 
Lithuanian bases. The Soviet Union claimed th~t the 
security of its Soviet garrisons in Lithuania had been 
compromised and demanded the resignation of the 
Lithuanian Minister of the Interior. The Lithuanian 
government's response was to appoint a Special 
Commission to investigate the matter. What followed 
94 Ibid . , p . 2 4 6 • 
95 
. Ibid . , p . 2 4 7 • 
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makes it clear that the Soviet government was not 
inte-rested in the Lithuanian Commissit)--n report. Rather 
it persisted in pressing the claim that the Lithuanian 
Minister of the Interior and the Director of the 
Department of State Security .had been instigators and 
organizers of anti-Sovi~t activities at the Soviet 
garrisons, and that the Lithuanian Prime Minister was 
trying to turn the Baltic Entente against the Soviet 
Union. Desperately trying to assuage the situation, 
the Lithuanian government sent a conciliatory message 
to Moscow and on June 12th removed both the Minister of 
the Interior and the Director of State Security from 
their posts. On June 14th the Soviet Union, 
nevertheless, handed Lithuania an ultimatum reiterating 
that the Lithuanian government had stood in violation 
of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet 
Union by preparing aggression against the Soviet 
garrisons~ The ultimatum now also interpreted the 
B~ltic Entente as a military alliance against the 
Soviet Union. It was therefore "necessary and urgent" 
that Lithuania comply with the explicit provisions of 
the ultimatum, turn over to the Soviet Union the 
Lithuanian Minister of the Interior and the Director of 
abiding by the terms of the Treaty of Mutual 
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Assistance, and suppress "firmly the enemies of this 
Treaty." In addition, free entry was to be ensured for 
"units of the army of the Soviet Union" to be 
"stationed in the most important centers of Lithuania" 
in sufficient numbers to "put an end to acts of 
provocation directed against the garrisons of the 
Soviet Union in Lithuania". The ultimatum concluded 
with the warning that refusal to respond according to 
these terms would be interpreted as a hostile move, and 
the Soviet Union would be compelled to act. 9~ 
The Lithuanian government, deliberating through 
the night, decided it had no choice but to submit and 
to resign. On June 15th large Soviet Army contingents 
moved across the Soviet-Lithuanian border. 
Concurrent with his resignation, President 
Smetana had appointed General Stasys Rastikis as the 
Prime Minister in charge of forming the new government. 
When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov rejected the 
choice of Rastikis and advised Smetana that Soviet 
Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vladimir 
Dekanozov was on his way to the capital city of Kaunas 
to assume control of the country, Smetana responded by 
declaring the terms of the ultimatum no longer 
96 b·. d I 1 ., p. 297-298. 
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acceptable and urged his cabinet to reverse its 
decision. But believing it was too late now that 
Soviet troops were pouring over the border, the cabinet 
refused. President Smetana left Lithuania and 
subsequently established a government in exile to 
assure the continuity of Lithuanian constitutional 
order. 
Also on June 15th it became Latvia's turn to 
confront Soviet aggression as Red Army units raided a 
Latvian frontier post. The following day Latvia· 
received its ultimatum. Meanwhile, reports were 
circulating that Soviet tank units and infantry were 
concentrated along the Soviet-Latvian border. Latvia 
was given only hours to respond. 
As in the case of Lithuania, the ultimatum 
demanded the "prompt formation of a government capable 
of insuring an honest implementation of the treaty of 
October 5, 1939" and "immediate consent to the entry of 
Soviet forces into Latvian territory in unlimited 
numbers. 1197 Once again, the Soviet Union alleged that 
Latvia had concluded a secret anti-Soviet military pact 
with Estonia apd Lithuania but added furthermore that 
Latvia had failed to denounce its 1923 military 
97 tk. Ru · 1.S , p . 2 4 7 . 
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alliance with Estonia (never before objected to by the 
Soviet Union) and that it had held conspiratorial 
conferences with its Baltic neighbors in December 1939 
and March 1940. Conferences had indeed taken place but 
had not been secret. As if this were not sufficient to 
press its point, the Soviet Union accused that the 
General Staffs of the three Baltic States had held 
secret meetings without Soviet participation (not 
true), and that a special anti-Soviet press organ had 
been created, the so-called Revue Baltigue. The 
reference was to a periodical which dealt with cultural 
and economic questions and branded as suspect because 
it was not published in Russian. 
Lacking viable options, the Latvian government 
succumbed to the ultimatum on June 16th. The following 
day, while the Red Army occupied Latvia, Andrei 
Vyshinsky presented himself as representative of the 
Council of Peoples Commissars at the home of the 
Latvian President, Karlis Ulmanis. Vyshinsky, 
accompanied by officials from the People's 
Commissariate of Foreign Affairs and of Internal 
Security, and functionaries of the Central Committee, 
informed Ulmanis that he had come to handle matters in 
connection with the ultimatum. It appears that he gave 
assurance to the President that he would keep his post 
68 
and that only a new cabinet of ministers would have to 
be chosen. 
Vyshinsky spent the next few days at the Soviet 
Legation drawing up a list of candidates for cabinet 
posts in a "people's government" which included 
journalists, a minor Social Democratic official, a 
left-winger from the Latgalian region, and two retired 
generals. Only two were Communists: the Minister of 
the Interior and the Chief of the Political Police. 
Once in place, the new puppet-gcivernment moved rapidly 
to legalize the Communist Party in Latvia and free 
political prisoners. President Ulmanis was placed 
under house arrest and compelled to sign the new 
government's decrees. Under instructions from Moscow, 
the Baltic States prepared for elections on July 14 and 
15th. 
Estonia's story is little different. Presented 
with an ultimatum on June 16th, the Estonian President, 
Konstantin Pats, also submitted and retained his 
Presidency while a "people's government" was installed 
by Andrei Zhdanov, Chairman of the Soviet Foreign 
Political Committee. President Pats was brutally 
coerced into rubber-stamping the new government formed 
under Johannes Vares. He nonetheless succeeded, if 
69 
only temporarily, in excluding· Communists from its 
ranks. 98 
With new governments in place in all three Baltic 
States, hundreds of Soviet citizens flooded in to take 
up all manner of posts in Communist party and 
government administrations, especially in the police 
and army. 99 Many were returning CommuDists of Baltic 
extraction. Violent purges followed with two waves of 
mass arrests in mid-July numbering in the thousands and 
conducted immediately before and after the elections. 
Most of the victims of the purges were never heard from 
. 
again. 
To insure favorable election outcomes, blatantly 
illegal changes had been made in the electoral law. 
The elections were conducted Soviet-style with single-
slates of candidates selected from the "Working 
People's Leagues". Not surprisingly the pro-Soviet 
coalitions won in all three Baltic states by nuge 
percentages (ninety-seven percent!) 100 and on July 21st 
the three newly elected Baltic People's Leagues 
convened and unanimously declared the conversion of 
98 Stromas, p. 292. 
99 , Rutk1s, p. 248. 
100 Wiezynski, p. 58. • 
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their states into Soviet Socialist Republics. The 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR meeting in August 1940, 
"accepted" Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as new 
Republics of the Soviet Union. 
The period of Soviet occupation from the summer 
of 1940 until the beginning of July 1941 is known as 
the period of the first Soviet occupation of Latvia, or 
"Baigais Gads" (Yeal", of Terror or Dire Year) . 101 It 
ended for Latvia, indeed all Baltic States, in 1941 
with Hitler's violation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the 
invasion of the Soviet Union. Latvia was to remain 
occupied by Germany until the fall of 1944. 
At first the Germans were welcomed as liberators, 
and the Latvians set up a civil administration in the 
hope that Latvian autonomy would soon be restored. 
Gradually, however, it became clear, that Nazi German 
intentions were not unlike those the Soviet Union had 
pursued: the incorporation of Latvia. Rather than 
serving the goal of restoring autonomy, the Latvian 
civil administration became a tool of Nazi-German civil 
administration. 
The Latvian military units formed during the 
Germaffloccupation under the auspices of the Latvian 
101 Rutkis, p. 252. 
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civil administration., the so-called "Latvian Legions", 
became tools of the German military. Numbering over . 
50,000, they fought as Latvian patriots along side the 
Germans and, following the defeat of Nazi Germ~ny, 
consequently faced a sorrowful fate. 102 Treated as 
traitors by the Soviet Union and as Nazis by the Allies 
-- until Allied policies changed allowing them to prove 
otherwise -- they were forcefully repatriated to stand 
trial in the Soviet Union. 
The first quarter of the twentieth century, 
having witnessed the Latvian people's achievement of 
their first national independence and pride in 
restoring and re-invigorating the LatVian national 
heritage, to Latvians is the epoch which proved the 
"viability of an alternative non-Soviet and self-
determined existence 11103 for Latvia as a nation. 
Metamorphosed, its events have become glamorized and 
romanticized in the collective memory of .many 
succeeding Latvian generations to a degree conditioning 
today's Latvian psyche. 1~ As Latvians confront the 
102 • Ibid., p. 256. 
103 V. Stanley Vardys, "Modernization and 
Nationalism", Problems of Communism, Vol.24, 
September/October, 1975, p. 36. 
104 • Ibid., p. 36. 
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documented historical truths now emerging about the 
Soviet seizure of the Baltic States, Latvian 
nationalists press even more adamantly than before for 
the restoration of Latvian independence as the only 
acceptable solution to their people's historical 
dilemma. 
73 
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CHAPTER V 
LATVIAN NATIONALISM UNDER SOVIET RULE -
THE RISE OF THE LATVIAN POPULAR FRONT 
Following the Red Army victory at Stalingrad in 
1942, the armies of the Third Reich were never able to 
rega.in the initiative. Soviet forces were advancing in 
the Baltic regions as the weakened Nazi German forces 
retreated. In their wake followed Soviet bureaus re-
instating Soviet authority. With German capitulation 
in 1945, all previous First Communist Party Secretaries 
in all of the Baltic States re-assumed their leadership 
positions. For Latvia this meant the return of Jani.s 
Kalnberzins. Another native Latvian, Vilis Lacis, 
became Chairman of the Councils of Peoples Commissars 
and, hence, served as second in command. All 
governmental forms and functions of the Co~munist Party 
organizations in Moscow were, in essence, replicated in 
Latvia. Moreover, since the Communist Party in Latvia 
remained very small for several years following Soviet 
74 
re-annexation -- membership was about 5,000 in 1945 -
-
it leaned heavily for support on Moscow. 
105 
Needing new, preferably Latvian speaking 
Communist Party members to carry out its policies, 
Moscow turned to repatriating native Latvians whose 
families had moved to Russia before Latvian 
independence. 106 In addition, large numbers· of native
 
Russians, attracted by the higher living standard in
 
the Baltic area and by advancement opportunities, a
lso 
immigrated. 107 This influx of ethnic Russians and 
returning "Russian Latvians" was greatly resented by
 
the Latvian people. 
Such negative reception blocked their 
assimilation, ·and the so-called "Latovichi," as the 
returning Latvians were called, felt alienated and 
became increasingly pro-Russian. Heavily Sovietized
, 
they themselves became intolerant toward native 
Latvians. 108 It was an ominous development because i
t 
105 , Rutk1.s, p. 2 60. 
. ;,~ 
1
~ Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years o
f 
Dependence, 1940-1980, p. 76. 
107 , Ibid., p. 76 
108 Dre if ields, Juris, "Latvian National Rebirth", 
Problems of Communism. July/August, 1989, p. 78. 
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was the latovichi who rose to fill many key 
governmental positions in Latvia. 
As already pointed out, the Latvian Communist 
Party (LaCP) depended upon Moscow's help. To crush the 
active Latvian resistance movement to Soviet control, 
both the Soviet military and State Security (MVD) 
forces rendered assistance. Remnants of the Latvian 
Legions had not surrendered to Soviet forces following 
re-occupation. Joined by large numbers of other 
Latvians they had fled into the forests and, organized 
into Latvian nationalist resistance groups, these 
"Brothers of the Forest" fought against the 
reestablishment of Soviet power. They were inspired by 
a sense of patriotic idealism and hope for the re-
installation of Latvian independence. The reign-of-
terror response by the Soviet Union was 
indiscriminately directed against the Latvian citizenry 
as a collective enemy and heightened the feeling of 
hopelessness already fostered by the effects of WWII 
and two occupations. All seemed lost, and yet as 
tensions between the victorious Allies and the Soviet 
Union increased following WWII, the hope rekindled that 
the Western Allies might eventually intervene and re-
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establish Baltic sovereignty. 109 Toward that goal, 
between 30,000 and 40,.000 Latvians participated in 
guerilla activities. Loosely organized into resistance 
cells, the~ concentrated upon efforts to disrupt Soviet 
I 
I 
activities f 110 The resistance movement lasted well into 
. ~ 
1 
\ . 1952. But despite tenacity, it was inevitably doomed 
and ultimately eliminated by overwhelming Soviet 
military and secret police forces sent to crush it. 
Concurrently with its military efforts the Soviet 
authorities were imposing land collectivization and 
conducting the mass purges of Latvian citizens which 
culminated in the deportation of at least 50,000 in 
1949. 111 The net result was that such resistance 
movements as the Brothers of the Forest were 
effectively deprived of the support so crucially needed 
from local populations. Since the purges not only 
decimated the native Latvian population but also 
specifically focused on the eradication of the so-
called "kulak" class, the resistance not only lost 
numerical support but important backing by Latvian 
1
~ Misiunas and Taagepera, p. 81. 
110 , Ibid., p. 83-86. 
111 , Ibid., p. 96. 
77 
community leaders. With the land re-distribution, 
self-interest also began to assert itself among 
Latvians at the expense of national commitments. The 
public perception of the Latvian guerrillas as national 
heroes began to change, in part because the guerrillas 
were increasingly driven to supporting their cause by 
any means they could, alienating their fellow Latvians. 
As the years passed resignation to the Soviet system to 
many Latvians became preferable to a hopeless fight, 
especially when non-intervention by the West during the 
brutal Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution destroyed the dream of eventual Western 
help. 
In spite of all efforts to Sovietize Latvia 
during the nearly fifty years since annexation, the 
Soviet Union has failed to suppress the national 
Latvian spirit. This failure, to a considerable 
degree, has its origins in the Bolshevik refusal to 
acknowledge the right of any of its national minorities 
to express their national identity other than in 
support of the system instituted by Lenin and shaped by 
Stalin. Beginning with the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, 
national self-identity in Party orientation had been 
forced to give way to Russian nationalism as the 
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implicitly needed common denominator in the Soviet 
Communist Party's self-definition. Consistently 
nurtured by Soviet leaders, it has become the 
fundamental obstacle in the path of Soviet state· 
efforts to legitimize the Soviet Union's role vis-a-vis 
its national minorities and blocks their assimilation 
through Sovietization. The case of Latvia is but ohe 
example. 
If the Soviet Union has not been able to make 
Communism work it is due in part to its inability to 
win the trust of its nationalities. It also failed to 
convincingly demonstrate that a union offers economic 
advantages, especially to more developed, nationally 
conscious regions. While the occasional wanton use of 
terror has assured political control, it has not 
promoted moral legitimacy. The so-called "Berklavs 
Affair" well illustrates this in application to Latvia.; 
It involved the purging of several top-ranking Latvian 
Communists in 1959-60, following the drift toward 
"Nationalist Communism" in the Latvian Communist I?arty 
{LaCP) at the beginning of the Khrushchev era. When 
the Soviet economy was re-organized in Latvia the 
promise of more autonomy for the Soviet Republics meant 
that preference was to be given to tl\Pse who could 
,r 
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Speak Latvian, and a number of ethnic Latvians were 
able to secure important positions in the LaCP's 
executive branches of the government. The most 
prominent among these was Eduards Berklavs, who became 
leader of the LaCP in 1958. 
Berklavs advocated policies designed to return 
Latvian characteristics to life in this Soviet 
Republic. Use of Latvian as the official language 
ranked high among his goals. He emphasized development 
of a home-based Latvian industry through utilization of 
locally available raw materials and native manpower. 
Moscow, worrying that this threatened Russian hegemony, 
clamped down and initiated a purge in 1959 which was to 
strike down Berklavs, and over 2,000 others. 
In the years following that purge the full weight 
of Sovietization has borne down upon Latvia. Even sd, 
nationalist Latvian dissent continued to be heard. For 
example, the "letter from 17 Communists" in 1972 
appeared in the West and appealed for help in stopping 
forced Russification of Latvian life. But for all 
practical purposes, overt Latvian nationalism was 
silenced or overwhelmed on all levels of Latvian life 
by the once-again repressive Soviet regime. That it 
was never fully quelled, its vigorous and rapid revival 
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stimulated by the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's 
glasnost and perestroika policies make eminently clear. 
However, Latvian nationalism is perceived to have only 
a fragile lease on life. Many Latvians today fear that 
if this renewed opportunity fails to restore the 
Latvian nation, its prospects will be lost forever. 112 
As a measure of Latvian anxiety, it finds expression in 
the extraordinary sense of urgency with which current 
Latvian nationalism manifests itself. 
That Latvian nationalism was able to gain this 
renewal was certainly a fortuitous historical 
coincidence. Without the timely advent of Gorbachev's 
enlightened programs, Latvia's future would have become 
increasingly ominous. For in the case of Latvia, the 
Soviet system's failure to Sovietize its national 
minorities was being neutralized and off-set by Soviet 
success in gradually altering the ethnic composition of 
Latvia's population. By the 1980's the population of 
ethnic Latvians in almost all areas of Latvia's former 
state territory were falling into a minority status due 
to the large influx of other ethnic groups and the 
Latvians' own low birth rate. This trend, if continued 
112 Juris Dreifields, "Latvian National Rebirth", p. 79. 
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at its alarming rate, would have placed Latvia's 
existence even as a Soviet Republic, in jeopardy. For 
the Soviet Union grants republic status to national 
minorities only where they compose a certain percentage 
of a region's population. Ftirthermore, sinbe Russian 
is the official language of the Soviet Union, the need 
for immigrants to the Latvian Republic to learn Latvian 
was beginning to disappear. 
The current resurgence of Latvian nationalism, 
not surprisingly, is carried by many different groups 
with many different aims and priorities. But among 
these, the Latvian People's Front (LTF) today c·learly 
ranks as the largest and preeminent political force. 
Members of the "Helsinki '86" group provided the 
impetus for its emergence. Composed of eighteen human 
rights advocates, specifically workers from the city of 
Liepaja who had joined together during the summer of 
1986, the Helsinki 1 86 were the first to dare to 
organize in Soviet Latvia since the deportations of 
dissenters in 1977. 
During the summer of 1986, the Helsinki '86 group 
organized a number of demonstrations which drew world 
in Latvian history it 
judged most significant: the declaration of Latvian 
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Independence, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the mass 
deportations of Latvian citizens to the Soviet Union 
during 1941. 113 This publicity did much to re-galvanize 
Latvian nationalism, and by the summer of 1987 
nationalist demonstrations in the Baltics had become 
world-class events. 114 Since then, each anniversary 
date of a fateful event in Latvian history has become a 
cause for mass demonstrations and world press 
attention. The anniversary of the Molotov-Ribb~ntrop 
Pact on August 23, 1988 drew more than 60,000 in Riga 
alone, and served as a reminder to the world that the 
Baltic Republics were once free sovereign nations. On 
June 21st preceding this event, a number of prominent 
activists, fifteen Latvians and two Russians, including 
two Lutheran ministers, several writers and teachers, 
had already joined with the leaders of Helsinki'86 and 
called upon the Latvian people to unite in a people's 
front. 115 Declaring themselves responsible for the 
drafting of a program designed to help define the goals 
113 Dreifields, "Latvian National Re-Birth", p. 82. 
114 Dreifields, p. 82. 
115 Radio Free Liberty, B_altic Area Report, "People's Front 
Planned", July 13, 1988, p. 31. 
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and structure of their ptojected organization, they 
moved for a convention to found it. Their appeals made 
clear that they were motivated into action by 
unhappiness with Soviet rule. The aims of the People's 
Front were declared to be 
1. the development and realization of 
Latvia' statehood (and national 
sovereignty outlined in the resolution 
adopted a the plenum of the Latvian 
Writers' Association); 
2. the implementation of the rights and 
freedoms proclaimed in the 
Constitution of the USSR and the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
3. the moral and ethical regeneration of 
society in accordance with universally 
accepted human values; 
4. environmental protection, which is so 
essential to the healthy development 
of the indi victual and nation. 
116 
During 1988 several other people's fronts 
emerged, and on July 11th Riga television dedicated a 
broadcast to this phenomenon. 
117 One question raised 
was whether these fronts should remain independent or 
should associate themselves with Latvia's government. 
At a meeting attended by Latvian intellectuals and held 
116 ~1-!...l 
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117 Radio Free Liberty, "Will the Advocates of a People's 
Unite?", August 4, 1988, p. 9. 
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on August 30th at the headquarters of the Latvian 
Writers' Association, specific plans were drawn for 
founding a unified Latvian People's Front at a congress 
to be held on October 8th and 9th. 118 
The draft program which already the August 
conference produced was printed in its entirety in both 
the Latvian and Russian Communist Party newspapers on 
the same day. Its nine reform proposals were designed 
to restructure and democratize life in Latvia. 119 
Generally, it supported perestroika and glasnost as 
instituted by Gorbachev but also resolutely called upon 
the Latvian people to become masters in their own 
land. 120 
The October congress was attended by over 1,000 
delegates, elected by over 110,000 people representing 
various Latvian activist groups, including 
environmentalists, the Helsinki '86 and the 
Independence group. About one third were Communist 
118 Radio Free Liberty, "Preparation for the Constituent 
Congress of the People's Front, August 9, 1988, p. 3. 
119 Radio Free Liberty, October 5, 1988, p. 11. 
120 • Ibid., p. 11-12. 
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Party members. 121 It designated 100 members to form a 
governing council from which a thirteen-member central 
board was chosen which, in turn, designated Dainis 
Ivans its President. 122 
The conservative response to the October LTF 
congress was the organization of "Interfront", 
consisting of Latvians overwhelmingly in favor of 
maintaining the Soviet status quo and Russian as the 
language of the Republic. 123 
By the spring of 1989, the LTF stood preeminent 
among the advocates of Latvian national interests. Th~ 
March 26th election to the Congress of People's 
Deputies graphically illustrates this. In contrast 
with past Soviet elections, now only six of the ninety-
six candidates ran unopposed. About eighty percent of 
those newly elected were reformist, and about half of 
these were LTF members. 124 Membership in the LTF had 
121 Dre if ields, p. 8 6. 
122 • Ibid., p. 86. 
123 • Ibid., p. 86. 
124 Radio Free Liberty, "A Victory for Reformers in Estonia 
and Latvia.", April 21, 1989, p. 5. 
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more than doubled from a year before and was estimated 
at over 250,000. 
In mid-May, LTF representatives met in Tallin, 
Estonia with representatives from other Popular Front 
movements to form a Baltic Assembly and consultative 
body. Representing all three Popular Front movements, 
it was to be called the "Baltic Council". As their 
joint statement made clear, it was their combined 
resolve to call for individual state sovereignty as 
well as the neutralization and de-militarization of 
their territories. Independence, as the three 
Republics reminded the public, had been lost due to 
collusion between Hitler and Stalin. Shortly after the 
meeting, on May 31st the LTF governing Board proposed 
to its general membership the question of whether the 
aim of LTF should be to promote an independent Latvia 
at this time. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, the 
LTF declared its intention to work for the achievement 
of national Latvian independence. 
Elections to local councils followed in December 
1989 with LTF-endorsed candidates taking more than 
seventy percent of the nearly 14,500 seats. In January 
1990 the Latvian Supreme Soviet granted alternative 
political parties legal status and constitutional 
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protection in accordance with the changes made in the 
Latvian Constitution. The Latvian Supreme Soviet also 
formally recognized the Latvian flag and national 
anthem as national symbols. As had the other Baltic 
Republics, Latvia eventually declared, in the name of 
its people, that the 1940 resolution of the Latvian 
Parliament to ask for incorporation into the Soviet 
Union had been illegal. At last, in February 1990 the 
S6viet Union, for the first time, acknowledged that a 
Secret Protocol existed in addition to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact. In March, Soviet President Gorbachev 
agreed to begin talks leading to independence in 
exchange for political support of his drive to become 
President of the USSR. But in April the Latvian 
Communist Party split when Russian speaking members 
refused to support the party platform calling for 
Latvian independence. 
With events now moving at a dizzying pace, the 
Latvian Supreme Soviet nevertheless voted, on May 4., 
1990 to declare national independence. The vote was 
138 in favor with none opposed, fifty-seven not 
participating and one absent. The 1922 Latvian 
constitution was cited as the legal base for the action 
taken and then suspended pending implementation of 
88 
constitutional reforms. But, concurrent with the 
constitutional reform work, negotiations toward 
independence were also to commence with the Soviet 
Union in the spirit of the 1920 Soviet-Latvian Peace 
Treaty. 
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CONCLUSION 
The current reassertion of Latvian nationalism is 
part of the historical continuum of the resolute 
nationalist spirit of the Latvian people. Modern 
Latvian nationalism exists not simply in reaction to 
the repression of Soviet Communism. It is the result 
of several important historical currents and 
circumstances which molded, over time, the Latvian 
national psyche. The German imposition of societal 
isolation in the thirteenth century preserved the 
ancient Latvian language and culture of an ethnically 
distinct people. Christianity, specifically as later 
espoused by the German Lutheran Church and Herrnhut 
missions, oriented the Latvi~n people toward western 
values. The nineteenth-century Latvian ''national 
awakening" which generated self-esteem and pride in the 
ancient past gave rise to a demand for national 
independence. Although national independence, when 
acheived, lasted but a short two decades, it was long 
enough to confirm Latvia's national viability as an 
independent state. 
The question now confronting the Soviet Union is 
not whether, but how to deal with these renewed Latvian 
nationalist forces. Whatever the Soviet Union decides 
90 
in this regard will be closely scrutinized by the West. 
Will Soviet domestic needs and considerations be ranked 
above Latvia's right to independence? Given the 
present situation, what course of action should the LTF 
now pursue to promote the restoration of Latvian 
independence? Or, will, once again, broader historical 
developments determine the outcome? 
91 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Public Documents 
U.S. Government, Congressional Records. 1984. 
U.S. Government, Department of State, Treaties And Other International Agreements Of The United States of America 1776-1949. 
U.S. Government, Federal Broadcast Information Service. 1990. 
U.S. Government, RFE-RL, Radio Free Europe Research. 1987-1990. 
Books 
Alexiev, Alexander. Dissent and Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic. Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation, September, 1983. 
Bilmanis, Alfred. A History of Latvia. Westport Conn: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1970. 
Dunn, Stephen P. Cultural Processes In The Baltic Area Under Soviet Rule. Berkeley, Ca: University of California, 1971. 
Ezergailis, Andrew. The 1917 Revolution in Latvia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 
Loit, Alexander. National Movements in the Baltic Countries during the Nineteenth Century. Stockholm: Center for Baltic Studies, 1985. 
Misiunas, Romuald J. and Taagepera, Rein. The Baltic States. Years of Dependence,1940-1980. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 
Rabinowitch, Alexander and Janet. Revolution and Politics irt Russia. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972. 
~ 
Rogg~r, Hans. Russia in the Age 
and Revolution 1881-1917. 
Group, 1983. 
92 
of Modernisation 
New York: Longman 
Rutkis, J. Latvia:Country and People. Stockholm: 
Latvian National Foundation, 1967. 
Simmons, George W., ed. Nationalism in the 
USSR & Eastern Europe in the Era of 
Brezhnev & Kosygin. Detroit, MI: The 
University of Detriot Press, 1977. 
Spekke, Arnol~s. History of Latvia. Stockholm: 
M. Goppers, 1951. 
Sprudzs, Adolf and Rusis, Armins. Res Baltica. 
Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1968. 
Tarulis, Albert N. Soviet Policy Toward The Baltic 
States, 1918-40. Notre Dame, In: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1959. 
Thaden, Edward C. Russification in the Baltic 
Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981. ~ 
Vizulis, Joseph I. Nations Under Duress: The 
Baltic States. Port Washington, NY: 
Associated Faculty Press, 1985. 
Von Rauch, Georg. The Baltic States. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1970. 
Wiezybski, Joseph L. The Modern Encyclopedia Of 
Russian And Soviet History. Gulf Breeze, FL: 
Academic International Press, 1981. 
Ziedonis, Jr., Arvids, Taagepera, Rein, 
Valgemae, Mardi. Problems of Mininations Baltic 
Perspectives. San Jose: Association for the 
Advancement of Baltic Studies, Inc., and 
California State University, San Jose, 1973. 
Articles 
Dreifields, Juris, "Latvian National Rebirth" 
Problems of Communism. July/August, (1989), 
pp. 77-95. 
Kowalewski, David, "Dissent in the Baltic 
Republics, Characteristics and Consequences" 
Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol.10, No.4, 
( 19 7 9 ) , pp . 3 0 9 - 3 19 . 
93 
Misiunas, Romuald and Taagepera, Rein, "The 
Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1980-
1986" Journal of Baltic States. Vol.20, 
No.1, (1989), pp. 65-88. 
Reme.ikis, Thomas, "Dissent in the Bal tic 
Republics - A Balance Sheet" Lituanus. 
Vol. 3 O, No. 2, ( 1984) , pp. 5-2 3. 
Stromas, Alex, "Soviet Incorporation Of The 
Baltic States And Their Incorporation 
Into The USSR: Political And Legal 
Aspects" East European Quarterly. Vol.19, 
No.3, September, (1985), pp. 291-333. 
Suziedelis, Saulius, "The Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact And The Baltic States: An Introduction 
And Interpretation" Lituanas, Vol.35, No.l, 
(1989). 
Thaden, Edward C., "Baltic National Movements 
during the Nineteenth Century" Journal of 
Baltic Studies. Vol.16, No.3, (1988), 
pp. 411-4 21. 
Vardys, V. Stanley, "Modernization and Baltic 
Nationalism" Problems of Communism. 
September/October, (1975), pp. 32-48. 
Vardys, V. Stanley, "The Baltic Peoples" 
Problems of Communism. September/October, 
(1967), pp. 55-64. 
Pamphlets 
American Latvian Association. Latvian News 
Digest. 1988-1990. 
Baltic Appeal To The United Nations. Baltic 
Chronology. 1988 and 1989. 
Legation of Latvia. Latvian Information Bulletin. 
1988 and 1989. 
94 
BIOGRAPHY 
The author is a first generation Canadian of 
Latvian descent born in Toronto, Ontario. She received 
her B.A. in History from Cedar Cedar College, 
Allentown, Pennsylvania in 1988 and M.A. in History 
from Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in 
1991. 
95 
